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WHEN THE TARGET MAY KNOW BETTER: EFFECTS
OF EXPERIENCE AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES
ON VALUE FROM MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
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Research summary: Extending research on the effect of experience on acquisition outcomes, we
examine how the differential in previous M&A experience between the target and the acquirer
affects the value they, respectively, obtain when the acquirer takes over the target. Drawing on
literature about organizational learning, negotiation, and information economics, we theorize that
the party with greater experience will be able to obtain more value. Furthermore, we theorize
that the effect of differential M&A experience on value obtained is contingent on the level of
information asymmetry the acquirer faces with respect to the target, specifically as a function
of the target’s product-market scope and whether the deal is friendly. We test and find support for
these predictions in a sample of 1,241 M&As over a 30-year period.
INTRODUCTION
Among the leading themes for research on merg-
ers and acquisitions (M&As) is whether the deals
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acquisition target; bargaining; product-market scope
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create economic value. The role of prior experi-
ence and experiential learning has featured promi-
nently in this literature (for a review, see Barkema
and Schijven, 2008a), probing when and how prior
experience contributes to value creation or improves
acquisition performance. Although this has offered
us many valuable insights on what drives value
creation in M&As, less is known about how the
value created in an M&A deal is shared among the
acquirer and target.1 As a result, we have limited
understanding of reasons why one party sometimes
1 Throughout the article, we refer to value creation for parsimony,
but our arguments hold fully in cases of value destruction, that is,
if one or both parties losemarket value uponM&Aannouncement.
Managerial summary: Corporate strategy is about a firm’s scope and development decisions
and outcomes, but corporate strategizing is incomplete unless managers anticipate the moves of
other economic actors. We demonstrate the importance of these points when it comes to learning
to make acquisitions. Using an innovative research design and theory that enables comparison
between acquirer and target gains, we show that whatever their firm’s acquisition history and
capabilities, acquisitive managers should mind the negotiation and other pitfalls that arise when
target firms possess ample acquisition experience of their own. We also demonstrate that the effect
of experience advantage, whereby the more experienced party benefits, depends on the target firm’s
scope and whether the deal is friendly—two dimensions that acquirers can and should take into
account. © 2016 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons
Ltd.
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gains more than the other party within a particu-
lar M&A deal, and which factors determine how
much of the total amount of value created in the deal
each party obtains. Indeed, the few studies that have
looked at acquirer versus target outcomes in M&A
deals (e.g., Seth, Song, and Pettit, 2000, 2002) have
highlighted that focusing solely on value creation
leads to an incomplete picture of how acquirers and
targets fare in M&As. Addressing this gap in the lit-
erature is critical to understanding under what con-
ditions acquirers and targets benefit from M&As.
To address this issue, we draw on the litera-
tures on organizational learning from experience,
on bargaining, and on information economics. Our
premise is that a balanced understanding of value
obtained by acquirer and target alike requires exam-
ining not only the acquirer’s M&A experience, but
also comparing it with the target’s M&A experience
since the respective outcomes are the result of a bar-
gaining process in which both parties play an active
role. Our research question is: What is the effect
of differential M&A experience on the respective
amounts of value obtained by the acquirer and tar-
get, and what are contingencies for this effect?
Specifically, we argue that the differential between
the acquirer and the target’s experience determines
which one will bargain better terms, and thereby,
obtain more value at the expense of the other party.
We then draw on the information economics litera-
ture to argue that the effect of differential experience
on the respective value each party obtains is con-
tingent on the information asymmetry the acquirer
faces with respect to the target. We examine our the-
oretical predictions using a sample of 1,241 M&As
that features detailed target as well as acquirer and
deal characteristics.
We aim to make several contributions to strat-
egy research at the union of the literature on
M&As, organizational learning, and information
economics. First, we contribute to the M&A liter-
ature by improving the understanding of the respec-
tive amounts of value obtained by the acquirer and
by the target, and how they compare. Carefully con-
trolling for how much value arises in total, we show
that differential experience influences how much
value each party obtains from the deal. Furthermore,
contrary to much of the M&A literature that under-
standably focuses on acquirer characteristics, we
hone in on the active and important role of the target
(see also Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004; Graebner,
2009) and explicate effects of target characteristics
and decisions.
Second, we contribute to research on organi-
zational learning by showing that value obtained
depends on both parties’ experience. Most prior
studies have only theoretically considered the
acquirer’s experience, and even the few studies that
considered both parties’ experience (e.g., Porrini,
2004) did so in isolation of each other without
theorizing about relative experience. Furthermore,
the organizational learning literature has mainly
provided insights on how experience helps the
development of an acquisition capability, which
helps to create value (Barkema and Schijven,
2008a); we complement this by highlighting that
experience also helps to capture value. We develop
this theory by also integrating arguments from
the literature on bargaining, from both organi-
zation behavioral (negotiation) and economic
(game theoretical and experimental) perspectives.
Both perspectives have identified experience as a
source of learning leading to improved bargaining
outcomes.
Third, whereas the application of information
economics to M&A strategy has largely focused
on the effect of information asymmetry on how
M&A deals are structured (e.g., Balakrishnan and
Koza, 1993; Cuypers, Ertug, and Hennart, 2015;
Dow, Cuypers, and Ertug, 2016), we show that
information factors are also important contingen-
cies that affect performance as evidenced here by
the respective value obtained upon deal announce-
ment. Thus, we extend the information economics
perspective, which is of growing importance for
strategy research (e.g., Ragozzino and Reuer, 2011;
Reuer et al., 2013).
Altogether, our contributions are phenomenolog-
ical in addressing the respective value accruing to
acquirers versus targets and in further evidencing
the role of targets, but also more broadly theoretical
in integrating the literatures on experiential learn-
ing, bargaining, and information economics in an
original way that yields a contingencymodel of how
differential experience and information asymmetry
jointly affect a strategic outcome.
THEORY
Since an acquisition is a transaction between the
owners and managers of the acquirer firm (in
short, the acquirer) and those of the target firm
(in short, the target), the total value that is created
(or destroyed) through an acquisition has to be
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distributed between these two sides. M&A out-
comes often differ sharply between acquirers and
targets (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1983; Datta,
Pinches, and Narayanan, 1992; Morck, Schleifer,
and Vishny, 1990). The bargaining between
acquirer and target (e.g., Aktas, De Bodt, and Roll,
2010) is likely to affect their respective gains. More
precisely, negotiations are a crucial part of creating
M&A deals as merging firms have to decide on
a number of issues—not just the price, but also
the retention of resources, including top managers
and their roles, residual target headquarters or
company name, and restructuring plans (Walsh,
1989; Wulf, 2004). Walsh (1989) thus emphasized
the importance of taking into account the attributes
of both parties as well as the transaction between
them, when studying the acquisition negotiation
and its outcome.
In this manner, prior acquisition experience
affects not only the potential for value creation
as described in extant literature, but also the way
value is distributed. Through the accumulation of
experience, firms learn how to negotiate deals (see
Nadler, Thompson, and Van Boven, 2003). This,
in turn, has implications for the value accruing to
the acquirer and the target (Barkema and Schijven,
2008a). Thus, Capron and Shen (2007) observed
that, in acquisitions of private targets by public
firms, the acquirer tends to appropriate more value;
they attributed this to the private target having
less acquisition experience, and consequently, less
developed negotiation skills, than the acquirer
(though they did not measure target experience).
These insights suggest that the differential acquisi-
tion experience of the target and the acquirer will
play a crucial role in determining which one will
receive how much of the value arising in the deal.
The notion that the respective levels of experi-
ence of two parties will determine the outcome of
negotiations has been documented in various con-
texts in the literature on negotiation from a psycho-
logical perspective, on one hand, and in literature
on game theory and experimental economics, on
the other hand (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998;
Thompson, 1990).
First, the negotiation literature has shown that
parties involved in past negotiations learn strategies
and skills that they can leverage in subsequent nego-
tiations, especially with other parties that lack simi-
lar skills, so that experience asymmetries determine
distributional outcomes (Thompson, 2008). Specif-
ically, there is compelling evidence in the literature
that experience helps negotiators create value, in
particular, by sorting better through negotiation
issues (“log-rolling”) (Loewenstein and Thompson,
2006). Moreover, experience increases negotiators’
ability to take the perspective of opponents (Neale
and Bazerman, 1983; Thompson, 1990) and to
obtain information on the other party’s preferences
without this being explicitly disclosed (Thompson,
2008). Experienced negotiators thus develop a
more accurate representation of their opponent’s
priorities, alternatives, and behavior (Thompson,
1990). Through experience, negotiators also learn
to claim greater value (increase their respective
value obtained) by knowing when to depart from
equal sharing among parties toward maximizing
their own value, and by exploiting their knowl-
edge of the other party’s preferences to deploy
tactics over the issues involved (Loewenstein and
Thompson, 2006). The negotiation literature has
validated both performance feedback and succes-
sive examples, both of which result directly from
accumulated experience as learning mechanisms
that enable the above advantages (Loewenstein and
Thompson, 2006). On balance, a considerable body
of evidence from simulated negotiations shows that
more experienced parties negotiate more effectively
and capture more value than their less experienced
counterparts (Loewenstein and Thompson, 2006;
Neale and Bazerman, 1983; Thompson, 1990). In
distributive negotiations—that is, where the parties
compete to divide the pie—experienced negotia-
tors perform particularly well and gain more than
their naïve counterparts (Murnighan et al., 1999).
Second, game theoretic and experimental eco-
nomics researchers have also looked at the impact
of experience on the outcomes of strategic interac-
tions, and described related mechanisms that add up
to an experience advantage in negotiations. They
found that adaptive learning occurs and is car-
ried over to subsequent games, allowing the player
with more experience to capture more value (e.g.,
Cooper, Garvin, and Kagel, 1997). Players learn
both from their past choices and by updating their
beliefs about what other players will do (Camerer,
2003; Camerer and Ho, 1999). A more experienced
player will be able to better anticipate the behavior
of the other player, estimate his or her reservation
price, and adjust his or her own strategy based on
feedback (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). Moreover,
as players gain experience, they start to take into
account that their counterparts are also learning and
adapting their behavior, and thus, stay ahead of the
© 2016 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 38: 609–625 (2017)
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counterparts, in a development referred to as sophis-
tication in the behavioral game theory literature:
More experienced players will exhibit more sophis-
ticated behavior than their less experienced coun-
terparts, giving them an advantage in anticipating
the behavior of their opponents and improving their
own strategies based on these insights (Camerer,
Ho, and Chong, 2001).
Thus, between them, the negotiation literature
and the (behavioral) game/experimental literature
identify a nexus of mechanisms for an experi-
ence advantage in negotiations: Superior experi-
ence helps negotiators identify and sort negotiation
issues, figure out counterparts’ preferences, map
each party’s preference onto the issues, decide when
and how to move toward an advantageous distri-
bution, and implement tactics that maximize their
value obtained.
Asymmetries in experience also stand to affect
the outcome of M&A negotiations and interactions.
Here, the principal basis of applicable experience is
having done previous M&As. This entails the same
steps and mechanisms as described in the above
literature: identifying negotiation points, anticipat-
ing the acquirer and target firms’ respective prefer-
ences, and manipulating the deal to maximize the
value obtained given the total value created. There-
fore, we expect that differences in experience will
explain which party obtains more or less value in
the context of M&As. Specifically, the asymmetry
linked with negotiation outcomes is likely to come
from the extra experience that the acquirer has rela-
tive to the target or vice versa (i.e., differential expe-
rience). Thus, the party with more previous M&A
experience, whether it is the acquirer or the tar-
get, stands to obtain more of the value generated by
the deal.
Anticipating our research design where we exam-
ine value obtained by the target as well as the
acquirer, we predict:
Hypothesis 1a: The value that the acquirer
obtains upon an acquisition is higher, the more
previous M&A experience it has versus the
target.
Hypothesis 1b: The value that the target obtains
upon an acquisition is higher, the more previous
M&A experience it has versus the acquirer.
The preceding initial hypotheses describe the
effect of differential experience on value obtained,
or in short, what we refer to below as the “experi-
ence advantage.” Nevertheless, several studies have
shown that returns to experience are contingent
(e.g., Vanneste and Puranam, 2010). Likewise, we
expect the experience advantage to have a con-
tingent component. We propose that there will be
an interaction between the amount of information
asymmetry the acquirer faces and the experience
advantage. That is because information asymme-
try complicates target evaluation and the negotiation
process, so differential experience is all the more
relevant under information asymmetry.
The information economics literature tells us that
many acquisitions are complicated by information
asymmetry between acquirers and potential targets
(e.g., Reuer and Ragozzino, 2008). This has impli-
cations for both acquirer and target. On the one
hand, acquirers face difficulties in assessing the
value of targets’ resources, and targets may try to
hide information that, if known, would reduce their
perceived value (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993;
Coff, 1999; Reuer and Ragozzino, 2012; Reuer,
Tong, and Wu, 2012). Such information asymme-
try may lead to acquirers’ overpaying for their tar-
gets (Coff, 1999) as it gives targets an informational
edge in bargaining (Samuelson, 1984). On the other
hand, even targets that have no intention of act-
ing in an opportunistic manner (by hiding informa-
tion from the acquirer) may suffer because of infor-
mation asymmetry, as they will struggle to convey
believably the true value of their resources during
negotiations (Dierickx and Koza, 1991; Reuer et al.,
2012).
Differential M&A experience will be crucial
in determining which party can better overcome
information asymmetry, and potentially exploit it to
obtain more beneficial terms. The M&A literature,
again focusing mostly on the acquirer side, has
argued that prior M&A experience translates into
hazard mitigating capabilities (Reuer, Shenkar, and
Ragozzino, 2004). Experienced acquirers will be
better able to recognize information asymmetry
and deal with it when conducting due diligence
and target evaluation, assessing targets’ claims,
and negotiating the terms of the deal (Dierickx and
Koza, 1991; Reuer and Ragozzino, 2008; Reuer
et al., 2004). Furthermore, acquirers with prior
M&A experience are more likely to transfer risk
of overpayment from the acquirer to the target in
the presence of information asymmetry (Reuer and
Ragozzino, 2008). We argue that, likewise, more
experienced targets can exploit the information
© 2016 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 38: 609–625 (2017)
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asymmetry to their benefit, such as by disguising
weaker assets or exaggerating synergy potential.
They can also better convey the value of their
resources where it benefits them. Therefore, we
expect the effects proposed in Hypotheses 1a and
1b (the experience advantage) to vary depending
on information asymmetry conditions. Below, we
consider two such conditions to derive specific
hypotheses.
The first important source of information asym-
metry that we consider is the product-market scope
of the target firm, which reflects the number of
economic activities it performs—more precisely,
the number of industries it operates in (Peng,
Lee, and Wang, 2005). A firm’s scope is a func-
tion of its reliance on indivisible assets that can
be shared among product-markets, specifically
knowledge-based assets (Panzar and Willig, 1981;
Teece, 1980). Thus, firm scope is directly associated
with the presence of proprietary know-how and
related knowledge-intensive assets, which cannot
be readily transferred, transacted, or valued (Arrow,
1971; Teece, 1980). Yet, meanwhile, the intensity
and potential complementarity of knowledge assets
in high-scope firms make an acquisition more com-
pelling as a means of accessing such assets (Teece,
1982). Therefore, aside from their size, firms that
operate in more industries are less transparent
and require more in-depth expertise to understand
(Malerba et al., 2008; Teece, 1982; Teece et al.,
1994). As a target firm’s scope increases, there
is thus an increase in the information asymmetry
that needs to be overcome to make an acquisition
possible (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Reuer and
Koza, 2000).
For our purpose, the information asymmetry that
characterizes targets with broader product-market
scope exacerbates the challenge for acquirers of
assessing the true value and combinatory potential
of these collections of units and knowledge bases.
This makes the benefits of a favorable experience
differential even greater from the acquirer’s stand-
point as experience helps the acquirer overcome
or compensate for information asymmetry (Reuer
and Ragozzino, 2008). If the experience differen-
tial is in the target’s favor, conversely, that firm
should be better able to exploit the information
asymmetry for bargaining advantage, and likewise,
to overcome any buyer reluctance due to asymme-
try by better conveying the true value of its assets
when it so chooses. In short, for acquirer and target
alike, having more experience than the other party
becomes particularly useful when the target is broad
in product-market scope. Hence, we predict:
Hypothesis 2: When the product-market scope
of the target firm is broader, the association
between the acquirer’s (target’s) differential
M&A experience versus the target (acquirer)
and the value that the acquirer (target) obtains
upon an acquisition is stronger.
Second, the severity of the information asymme-
try issue also depends on whether the attitude of
the target toward the acquirer is friendly, that is,
whether the target firm’s management and board
of directors agree to the deal. Targets tend to take
more defensive actions and have more incentive to
sabotage negotiations or behave opportunistically
in nonfriendly deals, thereby severely complicating
the acquisition process (e.g., Finkelstein and Hale-
blian, 2002). Conversely, in friendly deals, target
managers welcome the deal and have less incen-
tive to withhold or manipulate data given that their
reputation and likely career in the post-merger com-
pany are at stake; rather, they are committing to
openly sharing information to help the acquirer
better understand the target. In sum, when a deal
is friendly, an acquirer will face less information
asymmetry about the potential costs and overall
value of the deal than when the deal is nonfriendly
(Gao, 2011). This reduces the benefits associated
with either party’s experience advantage in dealing
with information asymmetry (as discussed above).
Accordingly, we predict:
Hypothesis 3: When the deal is friendly, the asso-
ciation between the acquirer’s (target’s) differen-
tial M&A experience versus the target (acquirer)
and the value that the acquirer (target) obtains
upon an acquisition is weaker.
METHODS
Sample
Testing the above hypotheses requires a sample of
M&As where the performance of both acquirer and
target can be measured and compared. We obtained
such a sample from Thomson Financial’s Security
Data Corporation (SDC) database, which has been
used frequently in M&A research (e.g., Cuypers
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et al., 2015; Dow et al., 2016; Haleblian and Finkel-
stein, 1999; Hayward, 2002). We obtained stock
market data from Thomson Financial’s Datastream
database to calculate the dependent variables, and
we used SDC, Datastream, and Standard & Poor’s
Compustat to compile the independent and con-
trol variables. Our sample is distinctive in that we
collected data on M&As between pairs of firms
that were both listed on either the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) or the NASDAQ stock exchange
(NASDAQ). We verified the data carefully, in par-
ticular, for confounding events (such as dividend
payments, replacement of the CEO, and so on, as
recommended by McWilliams and Siegel, 1997),
and for accuracy of the M&A announcement date,
using Lexis-Nexis—a source that provides broad
coverage of corporate events and announcements,
and is commonly used for this purpose (e.g., Whit-
tington, Yakis-Douglas, and Ahn, 2016). We thus
gathered complete and verified information on the
announcements of 1,241 M&A deals occurring
between 1980 and 2009.2
Dependent variables
To calculate the dependent variables, we followed
the procedure developed in the finance literature
(e.g., Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Bradley,
Desai, and Kim, 1988; Malatesta, 1983), and since
used in strategy and international business research
(e.g., Kumar, 2010; Seth et al., 2000, 2002), that
addresses value creation and howmuch of this value
each of the parties in inter-organizational settings
obtain. We first used event study methodology to
calculate the respective abnormal returns of the
acquirer and target firms upon the announcement of
the acquisition. Event studies have beenwidely used
in finance and strategic management as they are
particularly suitable to capture the value implica-
tions of investment decisions (Anand and Khanna,
2000; Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002; Park, 2004).
Abnormal returns measure performance implica-
tions of an M&A as they can be anticipated in
2 The 1,241M&Adeals are completeM&As, and thereby, exclude
leveraged buyouts, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders,
repurchases, acquisitions of remaining interests, privatizations,
minority stake offers, and so on. Our final sample might appear
somewhat smaller than that of some studies using the same data
sources (e.g., Carow, Heron, and Saxton, 2004). However, these
studies generally focus on the acquirer and do not require targets
that are stock listed. Taking this in consideration, our sample is
otherwise comparable to those used in other studies.
a near-instantaneous measurement window (e.g.,
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997; Fama et al.,
1969). Such an event-centered measurement is cru-
cial for our purpose as we look at the value obtained
not only by the acquirer, but also by the owners of
the target firm that ceases to exist as a separate entity
after the M&A.3
Specifically, we calculated cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) using the market model with a
250-day estimationwindow and a 21-day event win-
dow centered on the event date.4 This is consis-
tent with prior studies of the value implications of
M&As (e.g., Seth et al., 2000, 2002). We then veri-
fied the robustness of the results with shorter event
windows.5
The CARs, as expressed in percentage terms of
the firm’s total market value, cannot simply be com-
bined to calculate the total value that is created upon
the announcement of the acquisition, whichwe need
as a control variable in our models; nor can they
be used to test our hypotheses and compare the
value obtained by the acquirer with that obtained
by the target as acquirers and targets may differ
considerably in size.6 This is resolved by using
3 When the acquisition is agreed, returns from the deal accrue to
the acquirer’s shareholders (the acquirer, in short) and the target’s
shareholders (the target, in short) separately. This is the point
when the size and distribution of returns for both parties can
be assessed simultaneously. Ex post accounting measures, such
as ROA, or subjective retrospective evaluations would not allow
us to test our hypotheses as these deal with the value obtained
separately by each party. Hence, for our specific research question,
using stock market returns is the most compelling approach (see
also Seth, 1990a, 1990b; Seth et al., 2000, 2002; Kumar, 2010).
4 There is a trade-off between two issues when choosing an event
window: On one hand, a shorter event window might not capture
the effects of potential information leakage prior to the event
date or gradual diffusion of information after the event. On the
other hand, a longer event window increases the likelihood of
contamination from any confounding effects during the event
window. As mentioned above, we carefully checked for any
confounding effects during the event window to deal with the
latter issue. To deal with the former issue, we used a conservative
event window in our main analysis that covers 21 trading days
around the event ([-10, +10]). As discussed next, we verified the
results using multiple event windows to ensure that the results are
not dependent on any particular assumptions about information
disclosure to the market.
5 Specifically, following, for example,Westphal and Zajac (1998),
we checked the robustness of the results when using 11-day ([-5,
+5]) and 7-day ([-3, +3]) event windows surrounding the event
date. This yielded significant results that are consistent with our
hypotheses and similar with the main results.
6 This is illustrated as follows: The impact of relatedness between
acquirer and target has received considerable attention in the
M&A literature, with higher relatedness generally expected to
have a positive impact on the amount of synergies that are
achieved, that is, value creation. Suppose that two M&A deals
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absolute amounts of the value created, expressed in
U.S. dollars, instead of relative cumulative abnor-
mal returns expressed as percentages (Berkovitch
and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al., 2000, 2002).
Therefore, in a second step, we calculated the
total value associated with the announcement of the
acquisition in absolute terms. This equals the sum
of the values accruing in U.S. dollars to the acquirer
and the target. The value created by the acquirer can
be calculated by multiplying its pre-announcement
market value by the CARs to the acquirer during
the event window. The target’s value created can
be calculated in an identical way using target-side
pre-announcement market value and CARs. Hence,
the total value created upon announcement of the
acquisition can be expressed as (Berkovitch and
Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al., 2000):
Total Value Created = Value CapturedA +
Value CapturedT = SA−11P
A
−11
i=10∑
i=−10
ARAi + S
T
−11P
T
−11
i=10∑
i=−10
ARTi ,
where A is the acquirer and T is the target
firm, S− 11 is the number of shares on day -11, P− 11
is the share price on day -11, and
i=10∑
i=−10
ARi are the
cumulative abnormal returns during the [-10,10]
event window.
only differ in terms of how related the parties are and of the
market value of the respective acquirers: Acquirer 1 (in Deal
1) has a market value of $800 million and Acquirer 2 (in Deal
2) has a market value of $100 million. The parties in Deal 1
are twice as related as the parties in Deal 2, such that twice
the amount of absolute synergies is created in Deal 1 than in
Deal 2: $100million worth of synergies are achieved in Deal 1’
and $50million worth of synergies, in Deal 2. Further, assume
(for illustration purposes) that all the value created goes to the
acquirer. Therefore, Acquirer 1 would see its value increase by
twice as much as Acquirer 2 ($100million versus $50million).
From this scenario, we would, as expected, infer that a positive
relationship exists between how much value the acquirer obtains
and the level of relatedness between the parties. However, if we
used percentage returns instead, we would come to the opposite
and incorrect conclusion, as Acquirer 1 appears to benefit less (a
12.5% increase in value) in percentage terms than Acquirer 2 (a
50% increase in value). Using percentage returns and comparing
firms based on percentage returns would be inappropriate in this
example. Likewise, percentages would be inappropriate to test our
predictions, which compare respective value obtained. Instead,
absolute dollar returns are commonly used in both early M&A
research (e.g., Malatesta, 1983; Singh and Montgomery, 1987)
and more recent work (Goranova, Dharwadkar, and Brandes,
2010; Seth et al., 2002), and for the same comparative purpose
as ours.
To test our hypotheses, we need to compare the
value obtained by the acquirer with that obtained
by the target. Accordingly, we use, respectively,
the first term (absolute amount obtained by the
acquirer) and the second term (absolute amount
obtained by the target) in the above equation as
our dependent variables.7 Since we aim to isolate
effects of experience on respective value obtained,
we control for the total amount of value created (the
sum of the two terms in the above equation) in these
models. Thus, we are able to measure what slice of
the pie each party gets while controlling for the size
of the pie (Seth et al., 2000).
Insofar as our methods incorporate an event
study, some standard questions of interpretation
may arise. The main one is whether abnormal
returns upon M&A announcement represent extra
value for the party whose share price so moves.
Because the stock market is involved, abnormal
returns may be interpreted as value imputed
by investors based on their perception of the
announcement’s implications (Zajac and Westphal,
2004). Nevertheless, we believe that returns upon
announcement are especially indicative of realized
value for the firms in our sample, for several
reasons. We examine acquisitions of whole listed
firms, which get completed. Such deals require
agreement by the bulk of target shareholders, whose
expected compensation for tendering their shares is
directly affected by (and reflected in) the reaction
upon announcement. The size and visibility of
the listed targets also make it likely that reactions
are indicative of the eventual value generated on
the acquirer side during the deal’s execution time-
frame, although this relationship is less definite. (A
separate question is whether the acquirer’s returns
may vary in the longer term, assuming we could
measure the effect of the specific M&A without
confounds. We make no claims about this. Our
interest is in comparing the value accruing [or
imputed] to acquirer versus target, which can only
be done around deal announcement.)
Moreover, we study firms listed on the two
largest U.S. stock markets, which are the most
7 Testing our hypotheses is complicated by the fact that at least
one of the parties in a given M&A deal may have negative returns
upon announcement—as indeed is common (Morck et al., 1990).
As a result, a ratio of both parties’ returns has no straightforward
interpretation (Gulati andWang, 2003). Therefore, we follow Seth
et al.’s (2000) approach and use the amount of value the acquirer
obtains and the amount of value the target obtains as two separate
dependent variables.
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reliably efficient anywhere at imputing value based
on firm-specific information of the type of interest
here (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000). It remains that
the event study approach assumes semi-strong mar-
ket efficiency. Though sometimes a basis of dispute,
this assumption is commonly shared in the strategy
literature, in particular, in alliance andM&A studies
(e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000; Humphery-Jenner,
2014; Kale et al., 2002; McDonald, Westphal, and
Graebner, 2008). It has been extensively examined
and validated in the finance literature (Campbell
et al., 1997; Fama, 1991).
Independent variables
M&A experience difference (Hypotheses 1a–b, 2,
and 3)
We measured the M&A experience of the acquirer
as the count of all M&As that the firm completed
during the 10 years preceding the focal M&A. We
then subtracted the target’s M&A experience, mea-
sured likewise, from the acquirer’s M&A expe-
rience to measure the difference in experience
between the parties. This variable takes positive
values if the acquirer’s experience exceeds that of
the target and negative values if the target’s expe-
rience exceeds that of the acquirer. We verified our
results with several specifications of the experience
variables.8
Target product-market scope (Hypothesis 2)
We measured the target’s product-market scope
as the number of four-digit SIC codes in which
it operated at the time of the acquisition. This
variable is commonly used in studies of the effects
of product-market scope in M&As (e.g., Barkema
and Schijven, 2008b).9
8 We used multiple alternative specifications of the experience
measures to check the robustness of our findings. First, we used
multiple measurement windows to construct experience variables,
ranging from an unlimitedwindow to a four-year window. Second,
we checked the robustness of the results when discounting older
experience to compensate for the decay of experience over time.
Following Ingram and Baum (1997), we examined 30, 20, and
10 percent discount rates. Third, as several studies have assumed
decreasingmarginal returns to experience (Barkema and Schijven,
2008b), we ranmodels using ln-transformed experiencemeasures.
All these alternative specifications yielded results consistent with
those reported in the main analysis, which we deem appropriate
given that such M&As are not trivial events.
9 We tested the robustness of the results using measures based on
two-digit and three-digit SIC codes, and again found support for
all hypotheses.
Friendly deal attitude (Hypothesis 3)
We measured whether the deal was friendly or not
using a dummy variable coded 1 if the deal was
reported as friendly in SDC, and 0 otherwise. This
measure has frequently been used in M&A studies
(e.g., Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999).
Control variables
We controlled for factors at both the target and
the acquirer levels as well as at deal and year lev-
els, which may influence the amount of value cre-
ated upon announcement, or how much each party
receives. First, we controlled for initial profitability
using the return on equity of each party in the year
prior to the focal deal. Second, we controlled for
the acquirer and target’s absolute sizes using their
respective assets (in millions of U.S. dollars). Third,
we controlled for intangible resources using Tobin’s
Q, approximated by each firm’s market-to-book
ratio. Fourth, we controlled for the level of industry
concentration in the acquirer and target’s respective
primary industries (at the four-digit level, based on
Census of Manufacturers data).10 Fifth, to capture
any differences attributable to the stock exchange
on which the acquirer and target were listed, we
added two dummies identifying whether the target
and acquirer, respectively, were listed on the NYSE
(1) or NASDAQ (0). Sixth, we controlled for the rel-
ative size of the parties as the ratio of the acquirer’s
number of employees to the target’s number of
employees. Seventh, we controlled for relatedness
between acquirer and target with a dummy equaling
1 when both parties were active in the same 2-digit
SIC code, and 0 otherwise.11 Eighth, we controlled
for the number of bidders as the price of the target is
often bid up when there are multiple bidders. Ninth,
we controlled for the value of the transaction using
the total amount (in millions of U.S. dollars) paid
by the acquirer for the target, excluding fees and
expenses.12 Tenth, we controlled for the method of
10 In line with previousM&A research, we used the four-firm con-
centration ratio, but results remain robust when using alternatives
such as 8-firm, 20-firm, and 50-firm concentration ratios.
11 Measures based on three-digit and four-digit SIC codes yielded
similar results.
12 Instead of controlling for the value of the transaction, we also
explored models controlling for the premium paid by the acquirer
for the target. We measured the acquisition premium as the
acquirer’s bid minus the target’s pre-announcement value divided
by the target’s pre-announcement market value. This yielded
results that are consistent with the main analysis and supportive
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payment with dummy variables coded, respectively,
1 if a cash offer was made, and 0 otherwise, and 1
if stock was used to fund the deal, and 0 otherwise.
Both dummies took the value 1 when a hybrid pay-
ment of cash and stock was used. Eleventh, since
Hypothesis 2 involves target scope, we controlled
for the acquirer’s product-market scope as the num-
ber of four-digit SIC industries that it operated
in. Twelfth, we included year fixed effects for the
year in which each focal M&A was announced.13
Finally, in the identifying equation in which we
explain the total amount of value created, in the
first stage of 3SLS analyses (see details of estima-
tion approach below), we controlled separately for
the acquirer and the target’s respective prior M&A
experience. This is consistent with the literature on
value creation, while also allowing us to identify the
models.
Model specification
As discussed above, we study howmuch value each
party obtains, controlling for the total amount of
value created. However, previous research implies
that the total amount of value created is endoge-
nous. To account for this, we used 3SLS, which
is asymptotically more efficient than 2SLS. One
important additional benefit of the 3SLS approach
(also compared to IV regression) is that it avoids the
difficult selection of instrumental variables; iden-
tification alone is sufficient (Greene, 2012).14 As
mentioned above, we used separate experiencemea-
sures to identify the models. Other identification
of our hypotheses, however, the acquisition premium variable
was not significant (p-value> 0.700) in any model, while the
coefficients of the value of the transaction variable are significant
(p-value= 0.001) in all models. Thus, we deem the value of the
transaction more suitable as a control for the amount the acquirer
paid for the target.
13 Although we included several industry-level control variables
in the models, we also examined models with industry effects for
the acquirer’s or the target’s main industries. Since both parties
have the same primary industry in about 70 percent of cases,
controlling for both parties’ primary industry simultaneously
causes collinearity with sharp sample or variable loss. The
literature does not inform us whether it is more desirable to control
for the acquirer’s or the target’s industry. Therefore, we tested the
robustness of the results by adding acquirer and target industry
effects in separate models. Neither approach changed the results
in any substantive way.
14 Instead of a potentially problematic instrumental variable, the
3SLS technique uses all exogenous variables in themodel to create
a combined variable that acts as the “best instrument” (Kennedy,
2006).
approaches, including one where we excluded non-
significant variables in each equation, yielded simi-
lar results. We also used OLS regression to confirm
the robustness of the findings.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations can
be found in Tables 1 and 2. They are in linewith sim-
ilar studies (e.g., Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002;
McNamara, Haleblian, and Dykes, 2008; Seth et al.,
2000, 2002). In Table 1, the mean total value cre-
ated (combining acquirer and target effects) is neg-
ative (-$31.84million), meaning a decrease in the
combined value of the firms of 0.7 percent rela-
tive to pre-offer value. Approximately 49 percent
of deals create value, while 51 percent destroy
value. The value obtained by the acquirer averages
-$107.72million, while that for the target firm aver-
ages $75.88. Consistent with this, 35.9 percent of
acquirers earn positive returns versus 85.9 percent
of targets.
In Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we argue that the
respective value obtained by acquirer and target
firms depends on the difference in their M&A expe-
rience. As discussed above, to test these hypothe-
ses, we look separately at the value obtained by the
acquirer and that obtained by the target (see also
Seth et al., 2000). Results are reported in Table 3.
In models with the amount of value obtained by the
acquirer as the dependent variable (Models 1, 2, and
3), positive experience difference coefficients mean
that the acquirer obtains more value (at the expense
of the target) when its experience is larger relative to
the target’s. Conversely, in models with the amount
of value obtained by the target as dependent variable
(Models 4, 5, and 6), negative experience differ-
ence coefficients imply that the target obtains more
value (at the expense of the acquirer) if its experi-
ence advantage is larger.
All coefficients but one remain the same in
magnitude, but reverse sign when we change the
dependent variable from value obtained by the
acquirer to value obtained by the target. This is
because, given that we control for total value
created, the respective models represent a zero-sum
situation where for every dollar that is obtained
by the acquirer, the target loses the same amount
from the total value created. Only the coefficient of
total value created changes in magnitude when we
change the dependent variables in these models.
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Table 1. Statistics about absolute amounts of value obtained and cumulative abnormal returns
Variables Mean Std. dev.
Acquirer’s Value Obtained (m$) -107.72 639.71
Acquirer’s Value Obtained as a % of the Pre-offer Value of the Acquirer Firm (CARs) -3.5% 9.7%
Target’s Value Obtained (m$) 75.88 212.58
Target’s Value Obtained as a % of the Pre-offer Value of the Target Firm (CARs) 18.3% 20.7%
Total Value Created (or Destroyed) (m$) -31.84 647.90
Total Value Created/Destroyed as a % of the Pre-offer Value of Both Firms Combined -0.7% 8.8%
% of Deals where Acquirer Obtains Positive Value 35.9%
% of Deals where Target Obtains Positive Value 85.9%
% of Deals that Create Positive Total Value 49.4%
This coefficient indicates the relationship between
the value the focal party obtains and total value
created. A higher value of this variable implies that
a party obtains more of the value created.
In Model 1, we find a positive relationship
between the M&A Experience Difference variable
and the amount of value obtained by the acquirer
(p−value= 0.001). Hence, the more experience an
acquirer has compared to its target, the more value
the acquirer obtains. This is consistent with Hypoth-
esis 1a. Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, we find in
Model 4 a negative relationship (p−value= 0.001)
betweenM&AExperience Difference and the value
obtained by the acquirer; that is, the more experi-
ence a target has compared to its acquirer, the more
value the target obtains.
In terms of practical magnitudes and economic
effects, a firm whose experience exceeds that of
the other party by one standard deviation’s worth
of the M&A experience differential will see the
amount of value it obtains increase by approxi-
mately $21million on average. This represents an
increase of 1.3 percent over the pre-deal value for
the median acquiring firm and 12.8 percent over the
pre-deal value for the median target. In absolute, a
one-unit change in the M&A experience differen-
tial allows the advantaged party to obtain approxi-
mately an extra $2.7million. Hence, the experience
advantage effect we uncover is both statistically and
practically significant.
In Model 2, we find that the interaction term
between M&A Experience Difference and Tar-
get Product-Market Scope has a positive and sta-
tistically significant effect (p−value= 0.049) on
how much value the acquirer obtains. Similarly,
in Model 5, we find a negative and significant
(p-value= 0.049) effect of this interaction term on
howmuch value the target obtains. These results are
consistent with Hypothesis 2. Finally, the interac-
tion term betweenM&AExperience Difference and
FriendlyDeal Attitude has a negative and significant
effect (p−value= 0.091) on how much value the
acquirer obtains (Model 3). Consistent with this, we
find a positive interaction effect (p−value= 0.091)
in Model 6 where we look at how much value
the target obtains. These results offer support for
Hypothesis 3.
Examination of the practical magnitudes of the
hypothesizedmoderating effects confirms the above
inferences, but in terms of economic significance.
Specifically, the marginal effect of a unit change
in M&A experience differential is approximately
$27million higher when the deal is not friendly
compared to when it is friendly. Similarly, the
marginal effect of a one-unit change in M&A expe-
rience differential is approximately $1.7million
higher when the target’s level of diversification is
one standard deviation above the mean compared
to when its one standard deviation below the mean.
To verify the results, we used an alternative
dependent variable, which captures the difference
between the absolute value obtained by the acquirer
and that obtained by the target. This yielded results
consistent with the main analysis and supportive of
our hypotheses. Specifically, we find a positive and
significant relationship (p−value= 0.001) between
Value Difference (Acquirer value obtained – Target
value obtained) and M&A Experience Difference
(Acquirer M&A experience – Target M&A expe-
rience). This is consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Furthermore, the interaction term between M&A
Experience Difference and Target Product-Market
Scope has a positive and statistically significant
effect (p−value= 0.049) on value difference.
Finally, the interaction term between M&A Expe-
rience Difference and Friendly Deal Attitude
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Table 3. Determinants of value obtained by acquirer and target
Dependent variable: Acquirer Value Obtained
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant −15.761 −24.312 7.684
(105.107) [0.881] (103.792) [0.815] (86.516) [0.929]
Acquirer Profitability −0.129 −0.120 −0.130
(0.278) [0.644] (0.275) [0.664] (0.278) [0.640]
Target Profitability −0.283 −0.288 −0.297
(0.222) [0.203] (0.219) [0.190] (0.223) [0.182]
Acquirer Size −0.931 −0.889 −0.934
(0.244) [0.000] (0.236) [0.000] (0.243) [0.000]
Target Size −1.296 −1.518 −1.357
(1.330) [0.330] (1.291) [0.240] (1.334) [0.309]
Acquirer Tobin’s Q −2.062 −2.013 −2.038
(1.350) [0.127] (1.332) [0.131] (1.350) [0.131]
Target Tobin’s Q −2.703 −2.747 −2.743
(0.759) [0.000] (0.751) [0.000] (0.759) [0.000]
Acquirer Industry Concentration −0.137 −0.135 −0.138
(0.251) [0.586] (0.248) [0.588] (0.251) [0.583]
Target Industry Concentration −0.216 −0.217 −0.201
(0.255) [0.396] (0.252) [0.389] (0.255) [0.429]
Acquirer NYSE Listed 27.782 27.515 28.148
(11.715) [0.018] (11.564) [0.017] (11.704) [0.016]
Target NYSE Listed −12.966 −13.662 −12.520
(14.073) [0.357] (13.888) [0.325] (14.062) [0.373]
Relative Size −0.043 −0.040 −0.042
(0.049) [0.378] (0.048) [0.412] (0.049) [0.386]
Related M&A −5.235 −4.788 −5.558
(10.492) [0.618] (10.378) [0.645] (10.493) [0.596]
Number of Bidders 50.326 49.634 56.353
(18.573) [0.007] (18.349) [0.007] (18.882) [0.003]
Value of the Transaction −0.064 −0.063 −0.063
(0.005) [0.000] (0.005) [0.000] (0.005) [0.000]
Debt Funded Deal −23.890 −23.357 −23.125
(15.440) [0.122] (15.255) [0.126] (15.442) [0.134]
Stock Funded Deal 17.514 18.521 16.496
(39.414) [0.657] (38.930) [0.634] (39.394) [0.675]
Total Value Created 0.834 0.842 0.834
(0.042) [0.000] (0.041) [0.000] (0.042) [0.000]
Acquirer Product-Market Scope −4.309 −4.430 −4.269
(1.691) [0.011] (1.667) [0.008] (1.690) [0.012]
Target Product-Market Scope −7.320 −6.704 −7.301
(2.860) [0.010] (2.885) [0.020] (2.858) [0.011]
Friendly Attitude 19.526 21.227 39.712
(55.676) [0.726] (54.986) [0.699] (57.117) [0.487]
H1M&A Experience Difference (acquirer -
target)
2.732 2.514 2.905
(0.805) [0.001] (0.780) [0.001] (0.801) [0.000]
H2M&A Experience Difference×Target
Product-Market Scope
0.428
(0.218) [0.049]
H3M&A Experience Difference×Friendly
Attitude
−27.487
(16.264) [0.091]
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Nobs 1,241 1,241 1,241
R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.94
Chi-squared 4967.6 [0.000] 5166.48 [0.000] 4973.2 [0.000]
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Table 3. Continued
Dependent variable: Target Value Obtained
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant 15.761 24.312 7.684
(105.107) [0.881] (103.792) [0.815] (86.516) [0.929]
Acquirer Profitability 0.129 0.120 0.130
(0.278) [0.644] (0.275) [0.664] (0.278) [0.640]
Target Profitability 0.283 0.288 0.297
(0.222) [0.203] (0.219) [0.190] (0.223) [0.182]
Acquirer Size 0.931 0.889 0.934
(0.244) [0.000] (0.236) [0.000] (0.243) [0.000]
Target Size 1.296 1.518 1.357
(1.330) [0.330] (1.291) [0.240] (1.334) [0.309]
Acquirer Tobin’s Q 2.062 2.013 2.038
(1.350) [0.127] (1.332) [0.131] (1.350) [0.131]
Target Tobin’s Q 2.703 2.747 2.743
(0.759) [0.000] (0.751) [0.000] (0.759) [0.000]
Acquirer Industry Concentration 0.137 0.135 0.138
(0.251) [0.586] (0.248) [0.588] (0.251) [0.583]
Target Industry Concentration 0.216 0.217 0.201
(0.255) [0.396] (0.252) [0.389] (0.255) [0.429]
Acquirer NYSE Listed −27.782 −27.515 −28.148
(11.715) [0.018] (11.564) [0.017] (11.704) [0.016]
Target NYSE Listed 12.966 13.662 12.520
(14.073) [0.357] (13.888) [0.325] (14.062) [0.373]
Relative Size 0.043 0.040 0.042
(0.049) [0.378] (0.048) [0.412] (0.049) [0.386]
Related M&A 5.235 4.788 5.558
(10.492) [0.618] (10.378) [0.645] (10.493) [0.596]
Number of Bidders −50.326 −49.634 −56.353
(18.573) [0.007] (18.349) [0.007] (18.882) [0.003]
Value of the Transaction 0.064 0.063 0.063
(0.005) [0.000] (0.005) [0.000] (0.005) [0.000]
Debt Funded Deal 23.890 23.357 23.125
(15.440) [0.122] (15.255) [0.126] (15.442) [0.134]
Stock Funded Deal −17.514 −18.521 −16.496
(39.414) [0.657] (38.930) [0.634] (39.394) [0.675]
Total Value Created 0.166 0.158 0.166
(0.042) [0.000] (0.041) [0.000] (0.042) [0.000]
Acquirer Product-Market Scope 4.309 4.430 4.269
(1.691) [0.011] (1.667) [0.008] (1.690) [0.012]
Target Product-Market Scope 7.320 6.704 7.301
(2.860) [0.010] (2.885) [0.020] (2.858) [0.011]
Friendly Attitude −19.526 −21.227 −39.712
(55.676) [0.726] (54.986) [0.699] (57.117) [0.487]
H1M&A Experience Difference (acquirer - target) −2.732 −2.514 −2.905
(0.805) [0.001] (0.780) [0.001] (0.801) [0.000]
H2M&A Experience Difference×Target
Product-Market Scope
−0.428
(0.218) [0.049]
H3M&A Experience Difference×Friendly Attitude 27.487
(16.264) [0.091]
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Nobs 1241 1241 1241
R-squared 0.49 0.46 0.45
Chi-squared 968.2 [0.000] 992.27 [0.000] 974.3 [0.000]
Estimated coefficients are in bold. Standard errors are in parentheses. P−values are between square brackets. All tests are two tailed. In
the models with interaction terms, we used mean-centered first order terms to calculate the interactions terms. The first-stage equation
in the 3SLS model that explains the Total Value Created includes the following variables: Acquirer Profitability, Target Profitability
(-) [0.046], Acquirer Size (-) [0.000], Target Size (+) [0.000], Acquirer Tobin’s Q, Target Tobin’s Q, Acquirer Industry Concentration,
Target Industry Concentration, Acquirer Product Scope, Target Product-Market Scope (+) [0.027], Acquirer NYSE Listed, Target NYSE
Listed, Relative Size, RelatedM&A,Number of bidders, Friendly Attitude, Value of the Transaction (-) [0.000], Debt FundedDeal, Stock
Funded Deal, Acquirer’s M&A Experience (+) [0.000], and Target’s M&A Experience (+) [0.000] (variables underlined are significant
with p−values reported between squared brackets and the direction of the effect indicated between parentheses). Detailed results are
available from the authors on request.
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is negative and significant (p−value= 0.091).
Economic magnitudes are also confirmed.
DISCUSSION
We seek to examine the role of both the acquirer’s
and target’s experience in explaining how the value
created in an M&A deal accrues to the acquirer
and target. The findings support our main argument
that value obtained is an outcome of a distributive
process in which both acquirer and target play an
active role, such that differential experience is a
key determinant of which one obtains how much
value. The findings also show that the impact of
this experience advantage is contingent on the level
of information asymmetry imposed by the target’s
scope, and on whether the parties reach a friendly
agreement. That is, the respective value obtained
by acquirer and target depends on whether the
target knows better, or at least more—both about
M&As (experience differential) and about itself
(information asymmetry).
Our study makes several contributions to strat-
egy research. First, we contribute to the M&A lit-
erature by improving the understanding of acquirer
versus target returns in M&As. This issue is rela-
tively unexplored, yet it is critical if we are to under-
stand fully why and how various firms benefit or
fail to benefit from M&A deals. In addition, past
studies found effects of various target characteris-
tics (e.g., the target’s product-market scope, public
status, and size) on value creation; however, many
of these studies focus on the acquirer more than on
the target, if not exclusively on the acquirer. Our
findings suggest a more active role for the target
than is commonly attributed to them when it comes
to M&A performance. This role becomes more vis-
ible and is essential when it comes to appropriating
value. In addition, we show that the target’s past
decisions (i.e., regarding its product-market scope)
and its decisions during the acquisition process (i.e.,
whether to approach it as a friendly deal) are impor-
tant contingencies on the effect of differential expe-
rience on respective value obtained.
Second, we contribute to the research on orga-
nizational learning and synthesize it with the liter-
ature on bargaining and negotiation. Prior studies
have offered valuable insights into how experience
helps the development of an acquisition capability
that helps firms to create value. We highlight that
experience can lead to the creation of a capability
that helps with another important M&A issue, that
is, value capturing, plausibly through improved bar-
gaining and negotiation skills. In addition, studies in
this literature have mostly considered theoretically
one party’s experience, typically the acquirer’s, or
(more seldom) both parties’ experience but in iso-
lation of each other. We find an interesting inter-
dependency between both parties’ experience and
highlight the importance of considering differential
experience, as the source of experience advantage.
Third, our findings further the potential of using
information economics in strategic management
research. Information economics previously proved
a fruitful theoretical approach to look at issues
such as governance choice and partner selection
(e.g., Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Reuer and
Ragozzino, 2012). As shown here, it is also valu-
able in explaining performance outcomes. We also
show that targets can better use information asym-
metry to their advantage when they have an experi-
ence advantage, while acquirers with an experience
advantage are in a better position to overcome this
information asymmetry and capture a larger slice of
the pie.
We also note several potential limitations of this
study and opportunities for future research. First,
we study domestic M&As in one country with high
levels of M&A activity, the United States. It would
be interesting to verify results in other national, and
especially, cross-border settings where bargain-
ing might be different and additional sources of
information asymmetry might be present. Second,
we look at direct M&A experience. Future studies
could examine other forms of learning (e.g., Martin
and Salomon, 2003; Salomon and Martin, 2008).
Such effects would be interesting to study in other
external corporate development activities too (e.g.,
Cuypers and Martin, 2010; van den Oever and
Martin, 2015). Third, we use event study method-
ology to determine how much value is imputed to
each party upon announcement. Since the target
ceases to exist as a stand-alone entity after the deal
is completed, this approach uniquely allows us to
compare the value obtained by the acquirer with
that obtained by the target. Still, future research
could explore long-term performance implications
for the acquirer using accounting measures, such
as ROA, or subjective ex-post evaluations. Finally,
more practically, it would be interesting to examine
how acquirer-side managers consider their own
versus the other party’s experience when selecting
and valuing acquisition targets. Specifically, future
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studies could examine the experience effects of
potential acquirers and targets, via experience
advantage, on the likelihood of an acquisition
materializing between two parties and on which
party is the acquirer. Conditions for experience
advantage or even disadvantage also warrant further
study (see Ghosh et al., 2014). Notwithstanding
these limitations and avenues for future research,
this study increases the understanding of the
respective roles of acquirer and target in M&As,
and of how much value each obtains as a function
of experience and information asymmetries.
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